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ABSTRACT.  This  paper explores the problems  and  challenges  of  Co-management  of  beluga  and  narwhal  populations  in the Eastern Arctic region 
of  the  Northwest Territories. The  political  and  regulatory  context  of  Co-management has changed  in the last 14 years. Regulations were amended 
in 1980 and  1990  to  limit  harvest  and  the  conditions  of harvest. The Nunavut  Land  Claim  Settlement  Agreement-in-Principle  of 1990 created a 
new framework for wildlife  management.  The 1990 Supreme Court decision in the Sparrow case  was  a  strong  admonition for native  involvement 
in  management  of their fisheries resources. Canada  and  Greenland  formed  a joint commission for conservation and management  of  shared  stocks 
of narwhals  and belugas. The history of Southeast  Baffin  beluga  Co-management, our case study, is one of informal  and  incomplete  Co-management, 
because hunters did  not  have  full  participation  in the research pertaining to  the  evaluation  of  stock status, nor  did  they  have  the  power to decide 
on the  management of the stock. The decision  of Fisheries and Oceans to  severely limit beluga  hunting  created  a crisis, which  eventually  led  to 
the  creation  of  a  formal  complete  beluga  Co-management  committee.  We  conclude  that  complete  co-management,  with full participation  of  Inuit 
hunters,  is  necessary for effective  Conservation  and  management  of  eastern  Canadian small whales. Nevertheless,  the  vast  area  through  which  narwhal 
and  beluga  populations  range, the large number  of  people  and  communities  that  would be involved  in  such  a Co-management process  and  the  difficulty 
in  determining stock status are important  challenges  to  Co-managers. 
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&SUMÉ. Dans cet article, nous  discutons des problkmes et d6fits de la Co-gestion des populations de Wlugas et de narvals de la region est arctique 
des Territoires du  Nord-Ouest. Le contexte  politique et juridique de la  co-gestion  a Chang6 durant les quatorze demitxes ann&. Les r6glements 
ont 6t6  amend6 en 1980  et  1990 pour limiter le niveau  ou  les conditions de chasse.  L’accord‘ de principe de 1990 sur la revendication territoriale 
du  Nunavut  a Cr&  un nouveau cadre pour la  gestion de la faune. La dkision de la Cour Supdme sur le cas Sparrow  a  6t6  une forte exhortation 
en faveur de la participation des aborigbnes dans la gestion  de leurs ressources halieutiques.  L‘historique de la Co-gestion du  beluga du sud-est de 
la Terre de Baffin,  notre  sujet  d’ktude, en est un de co-gestion informelle et incomplete, parce que les chasseurs n’avaient  pas  pleine  participation 
dans les recherches visant B l’tvaluation du statut de ce stock  ou le pouvoir  de prendre des dkisions  de gestion.  La dkision de Pkhes et Oc&s 
de s6vbrement limiter la chasse aux Mlugas a Cr& une crise qui a  6ventuellement  men& a la crhtion d‘un comit6 officiel de complete Co-gestion 
du Mluga. Nous  concluons  qu’un  systkme de compkte co-gestion est nkessaire pour la conservation et la gestion des petites  baleines de l’est de 
l’Arctique canadien. Cependant, l’immensit6 de la rkpartition des b6lugas et des narvals, le grand  nombre de gens et de communaut6s  impliqu6s 
dans un tel  processus de co-gestion  et la difficult6  d’kvaluer  l’6tat des populations  sont d’importants dBfits pour les Co-gestionnaires. 
Mot cl&: sud-est de Baffin, baie de Baffin, haut Arctique, Groënland, chasseurs, r h l t e ,  conservation, protection, Nunavut, Sparrow 
INTRODUCTION 
Co-management agreements, described by Pinkerton (1989) 
as  systems of shared  decision  making  between resource users 
and governments, are often born in crises because they are 
creative ways  of  solving  difficult  management  problems.  Many 
Co-management agreements are incomplete  and  unsuccessful 
because  parties to the  agreement  do  not  share  every  management 
function. Such incomplete Co-management systems are not 
necessarily  static;  some  may  be  evolving  toward more  compre- 
hensive Co-management systems.  Pinkerton  (1989)  found  the 
comparison of successful and unsuccessful Co-management 
systems  useful  in  determining  what  conditions are needed to 
have successful agreements that engender a high degree of 
collaboration between resource users and government and 
ultimately  yield appropriate,  efficient  and  equitable  management 
systems. In this paper, we present the context of small  whale 
Co-management  in the  Eastern  Canadian Arctic, an area that 
includes the Keewatin and Baffin regions of the Northwest 
Territories  (Fig. 1). Drawing  from  the  experience  in  co-manage- 
ment of the  Southeast  Baffin beluga, we try to identify  those 
conditions that favour co-management of Eastern Canadian 
Arctic small  whales  and  those  that do not. 
Four putative stocks of belugas and two of narwhals are 
currently  recognized  for  management  purposes  in  the  Canadian 
Eastern  Arctic  region.  The  population  numbers  given  below are 
underestimates,  because they are based on sample  counts  made 
of surface or near-surface  animals. There is presently no way 
of determining  the  exact  population size of these stocks, but 
these  numbers are useful  as  indices of relative  population size. 
The  Baffin Bay (or Canadian  High  Arctic)  beluga stock, which 
summers in western Lancaster Sound, Barrow Strait, Prince 
Regent Inlet and Peel Sound and most probably winters in 
eastern Davis Strait (Smith et al., 1985;  McLaren  and  Davis, 
1982;  Finley  and  Renaud,  1980; Sergeant, 1979; Heide- 
Jpirgensen, l m ) ,  numbers  at  least 10 O00 belugas.  The  Western 
Hudson Bay  beluga stock, which  summers  along  the  west  and 
south  coasts of  Hudson  Bay and is thought to winter  in  the  pack 
ice  of  Hudson  Strait  and  southwest  Davis  Strait,  numbers  at  least 
23 O00 belugas  (Richard et al., 1990). The  Eastern  Hudson  Bay 
stock,  summering  along  the  east  coast f  Hudson  Bay and  James 
Bay,  numbers  at  least 2000 belugas  (Smith  and  Hammill,  1986; 
Reeves  and  Mitchell, 1987,1989) and is also thought  to  winter 
in Hudson  Strait  and  southwest  Davis  Strait.  The  Southeast  (SE) 
Baffin beluga stock, which summers in Cumberland Sound, 
Frobisher Bay and  along the south  coast  of  Baffin  Island  and 
is thought to winter in the pack ice of  southwest  Davis Strait 
and eastern Hudson  Strait,  numbers  at  least 500 belugas  (Richard 
and Orr, 1986;  Richard et al., 1990;  Richard,  1991a).  Belugas 
are seen in  other areas in  summer,  such  as  northern  Hudson 
Bay and  Ungava  Bay,  but  their  stock  identity  is  unclear  (Richard 
et al., 1990). The  Ungava Bay belugas  could  be a remnant of 
the Ungava  Bay stock, which  has all but  been  extirpated  (Smith 
and Hammill, 1986; Reeves and Mitchell, 1989). 
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FIG. I .  Stocks of beluga  and  narwhal  in  the  Eastern  Arctic  region of the  North- 
west  Territories  (shaded  land area) and  other stocks from adjacent areas referred 
to in  text.  (Note: figure shows  their  summer  distribution.)  Legend:  BBN:  Baffin 
Bay  narwhal;  BBB:  Baffin  Bay beluga;  SEBB:  SE  Baffin  beluga;  UBB:  Ungava 
Bay  beluga;  NHBN:  Northern  Hudson  Bay  narwhal;  WHBB:  Western  Hudson 
Bay beluga; EHBB: Eastern Hudson Bay beluga; 1-Pangnirtung; 2-Iqaluit; 
3-Lake  Harbour. 
The  North  Hudson Bay narwhal  stock,  which  summers  in  the 
Repulse  Bay  and  Frozen  Strait  areas  of  northwestern  Hudson 
Bay  and  may  winter  in eastern  Hudson  Strait,  is  estimated  to 
number  at  least  1300  narwhals  (Richard,  1991b).  The  Baffin 
Bay (or  Canadian  High  Arctic)  narwhal  stock,  which  summers 
in  Eclipse  Sound,  Admiralty  Inlet,  Prince  Regent  Inlet,  Peel 
Sound  and  Jones  Sound  (Mansfield et al., 1975;  Strong,  1988) 
and winters in Davis Strait south of Disko Island (McLaren 
and  Davis,  1982;  Heide-Jqhgensen,  1990),  is  estimated  to 
number at least 18 O00 narwhals (Strong, 1988). 
Inuit  of  the  Canadian  Eastern  Arctic  have  hunted these belugas 
and  narwhals  for  several  hundreds  of  years  and still rely  heavily 
on  them as a food, economic and cultural resource. The 
historical  impact  of  subsistence  hunting  on  these  populations 
is  unknown,  but  it  is  worth  noting  that  some  of  the  stocks  of 
belugas that have been subjected to the combined effects of 
subsistence  and  commercial  whaling  have  suffered large  declines 
to  the  point  of  being  classed  “threatened” or “endangered. ” 
Hunting  for  local  subsistence  need  alone  is  not  known to have 
caused population declines. The stocks that have suffered 
obvious declines are the SE Baffin stock of the Northwest 
Territories  and  the  Ungava  and  Eastern  Hudson Bay stocks  of 
northern  Quebec,  which  were  subjected to heavy commercial 
harvests (Kemper, 1980; Brodie et al., 1981; Mitchell and 
Reeves, 1981; Richard et al., 1990; Reeves and Mitchell, 
1987, 1989). 
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POLITICAL AND REGULATORY CONTEXT OF 
EASTERN ARCTIC REGION SMALL WHALE CO-MANAGEMENT 
No  discussion  of  Co-management  is  possible  without  a  descrip- 
tion of the political and regulatory context in which it is 
evolving.  Belugas and narwhals are considered “fish” under 
the  Fisheries  Act  of  1867.  Beluga  and  narwhal  management  in 
Canada is therefore a responsibility of the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). The department enacted the 
Beluga  Protection  Regulations  under  the  Fisheries  Act  in  1949 
and they were last amended in 1990. Narwhal Protection 
Regulations  were  enacted  in  1971  and  last  amended  in  1980. 
Both  regulations  provide  for  the  protection  of  habitat,  manage- 
ment’ of the species and control of the harvest. The Beluga 
Protection  Regulations  limit  beluga  hunting  without  a  license 
to Inuit or Indian natives of Canada. Community quotas for 
narwhal  catches  were  developed  after  consultation  in  the  1970s 
with  narwhal  hunting  communities.  The  objective was to set 
a  quota  for  each  community  that  would  ensure  subsistence  needs 
but  control  the  expansion  of  narwhal  hunting  for  commercial 
purposes.  This  was  the  DFO’s  earliest  attempt  to  consult  users 
on  the  management  of  Eastern  Canadian  Arctic  small  whales. 
The Inuit Land Claim of the Eastern Arctic, negotiated 
between  the  Tungavik  Federation of Nunavut  and  the  Govern- 
ment  of  Canada,  has  a  paramount  importance  in  influencing  the 
development of Co-management of Eastern Canadian Arctic 
small whales. The Nunavut Land Claim covers the Eastern 
Arctic  region  and  part  of  the  Central  Arctic  region  of  the  North- 
west Territories and has been negotiated over the last two 
decades.  An  agreement-in-principle  was  signed  in  April  1990 
(Anonymous,  1990);  the  final  agreement  was  signed  on  January 
1992  (Anonymous,  1992a)  and  is  planned  to  be  ratified  in  1993. 
Under  the  agreement,  local  hunters  and  trappers  organizations 
(HTOs), extant in every community as hunters and trappers 
associations  (HTAs),  will  be  officially  responsible  for  day-to- 
day management and local allocation decisions, an official 
recognition  of  a  system  already  in  place.  For  example,  HTAs 
presently  control  the  distribution  of  narwhal  tags  to  hunters. 
Regional wildlife organizations (RWOs), such as the Baffin 
Regional  Hunters  and  Trappers  Committee,  consist of represen- 
tatives  from  all  local  HTAs.  The  RWOs  will  make  allocation 
decisions  at  the  regional  level,  an  example  being  the  allocation 
of  narwhal  tags  among  communities. 
The Nunavut Wildlife Management Board (NWMB) is a 
Co-management  organization  defined  under  the terms  of the land 
claim  agreement.  It  is  to  consist  of  four  representatives  from 
the RWOs  and  four  representatives  from  federal  and  territorial 
government departments. Among other responsibilities, the 
board  will  forward  its  decisions  with  regard  to all matters  related 
to  wildlife  harvesting  in  Nunavut  to  the  appropriate  federal  and 
territorial  ministers.  Under  the  terms  of  the  land  claim  agree- 
ment,  the  Minister  of  Fisheries  and  Oceans  must  accept  and 
implement  decisions of the  NWMB,  except  when  they  conflict 
with the principles of conservation, the harvesting rights of 
others,  the  purpose and  policies  of  parks,  sanctuaries  and  conser- 
vation  areas or with  public  health  and  safety.  The  Minister  may 
also  reject  decisions  that  are  not  supported by or consistent  with 
the  evidence  available to the NWMB. The  Nunavut  Wildlife 
Management  Advisory  Board  (NWMAB),  composed of Inuit 
and  government  members,  was  created  in  1989 as an  interim 
Co-management board so that  a  working  wildlife  management 
system would be in place by the time of ratification of the 
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Nunavut  Land  Claim  Agreement  and  the  formal  creation  of  the 
NWMB. It had  limited  funding,  enough  to  hold  regular  meetings 
but  not  enough to do community  consultation and, as we  found 
out later, to  fully  establish  itself  with the users as a  credible 
organization. 
In  May  1990,  a  unanimous  Supreme  Court  decision on an 
appeal on behalf  of  a  British  Columbia  native  fisherman  named 
Ronald Sparrow  against  DFO  substantially  altered  the  relation- 
ship  between  Canadian  native  resource  users  and  government 
administrations  (Supreme  Court  of  Canada,  1990).  The  deci- 
sion  implies  that  the  constitutionally  protected  aboriginal  right 
to fish  resources  cannot  be  limited by government  unless  such 
limitation  is  necessary  for  the  conservation  and  protection  of 
the  resource  and  is  thereby  consistent  with  the  protection  of  the 
aboriginal right. Proof that an aboriginal harvest of a fish 
resource  threatens  its  conservation, and  consequently  the  future 
right  of  aboriginals  to  harvest,  is  therefore  necessary  before  that 
harvest  can be restricted.  The  court  did  not  specify  which  species 
of  fish are subject  to this decision,  but  it  is  being  interpreted 
as  any  fish  species  traditionally  fished by aboriginals and, given 
the  Fisheries  Act’s  definition  of “fish,” this  includes  marine 
mammals. The Supreme Court sent a clear message that a 
trust-like,  non-adversarial  relationship  must  exist  between the 
government and aboriginal  people  in  dealing  with  fish  resource 
issues.  This  decision  constitutes  a  strong  admonition  for  native 
participation  in  the  management  of  their  fish  resources. 
The fact  that  the  Baffin  Bay  beluga  and  narwhal  populations 
are exploited  both by Eastern  Canadian  Arctic  Inuit  and  West 
Greenlanders  is  obviously  of  considerable  importance.  Recog- 
nizing that fact, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans of 
the  Government  of  Canada  and  the  Ministry  of  Fisheries  and 
Industry  of  the  Greenland  Home  Rule  Government  signed  a 
Memorandum  of  Understanding  (Anonymous,  1989)  in  Decem- 
ber  1989  establishing  a  Joint  Commission  for  the  Conservation 
and  Management  of  Narwhal  and  Beluga  that  migrate  between 
the  waters  of  Canada  and  Greenland.  The joint commission  is 
responsible  for  the  exchange  of  information  and the coordina- 
tion of joint research projects and involves resource users 
through its Inuit commissioners and delegation ‘from Inuit 
organizations.  The  joint  commission  has  established  a  scientific 
working  roup to submit  proposals  concerning  scientific 
research and  recommendations  respecting  the  conservation  and 
management  of stocks to the  responsible  governments 
(Anonymous,  1991,  1992b).  The  scientific  working  group  has 
been  instructed  to  take  account  of  resource  user  knowledge  in 
developing  its  advice.  Decisions  and  recommendations  of  the 
joint commission are made by consensus  and  submitted  to  both 
governments  for  approval. 
CO-MANAGEMENT OF THE  SE BAFFIN BELUGA 
STOCK: A CASE STUDY 
The  past  14  years  of  management  of  the SE Baffin  beluga 
stock  illustrate  some  of  the  problems  that  must  be  overcome 
before a working system of cooperative management can 
become  a  reality.  It  is the history  of an incomplete  co- 
management  system.  Much  of  what  occurred  during  these  years 
predated  the  signing  of  the  Nunavut  land  claim or the  Supreme 
Court  decision in the  Sparrow  case.  The  context  is  therefore 
one  of  transition  presently  taking  place  between  a  government- 
controlled  regulatory  system  and  the  system  of  co-management. 
As is often the case  (Pinkerton,  1989),  attempts at creating 
a  co-management  process  arose  from  a  crisis:  the  perception 
that  the  stock  was  experiencing  rapid  depletion.  There  had  been 
a  well-documented  decline  in this stock  since  the  early  1920s, 
due initially to a commercial whale harvest at Pangnirtung 
(Kemper, 1980; Brodie et al., 1981; Mitchell and Reeves, 
1981).  The  stock size, estimated  at  more than 5000 animals prior 
to  commercial  exploitation,  was  reduced  to  a  fraction  of  that 
number by the  1960s  (Mitchell  and  Reeves,  1981).  The  popu- 
lation  size  is  thought o have been stable  during  the  1960s  and 
early  1970s.  However  the  revival  of  the  commercial  fishery  in 
the  late  1970s  to  market  muktuk  for  intersettlement  trade  led 
to  a  further  decline  (Brodie et al., 1981).  DFO  biologists  and 
managers  became  concerned  that this harvest  was  too  high  to 
be  sustained by the  population  when  only  about  a  few  hundred 
could be counted (Kemper, 1980; Brodie et al., 1981). 
These  concerns  were  conveyed to the Pangnirtung  Hunters 
and  Trappers  Association  (HTA),  which  agreed to stop  inter- 
settlement  trade  and  limit  harvest  to  domestic  purposes  (Brodie 
et al., 1981).  In  1979, DFO conducted  a  boat  and  cliff  survey 
and  held  a  public  meeting to  report  on  the  results.  DFO  represen- 
tatives  expressed  their  concerns and, after much debate, the 
meeting  resulted  in  a  vote  to  limit  harvest  to 40 belugas  for  the 
Pangnirtung  area.  In  exchange,  the  department  agreed  to  raise 
the narwhal  quota  from  15 to 40 (Brodie et al., 1981).  These 
new quotas were enacted in amendments to the Beluga and 
Narwhal Protection Regulations in 1980. 
Between  1980  and  1986,  boat or aerial  surveys  of  the head 
of Cumberland  Sound  were  done  annually by  DFO  biologists 
(Richard  and Orr, 1986). In 1985  and  1986,  aerial  surveys  were 
done  over  the  entire  summer  range  of the herd  (Richard et al., 
1990).  Inuit  from  Pangnirtung  were  present  in all surveys.  They 
served as guides during the ground-based surveys and were 
taken as observers on the aerial surveys. Meetings with the 
Pangnirtung  HTA  were  held  before  the  surveys  to  explain  what 
was  planned  and  solicit  suggestions  and  again  some  months  after 
the  surveys to explain  the  results.  However,  Inuit  felt  they had 
no real  influence  in  planning  the  surveys  and  that  heir 
observations  were  not  used  in  deriving  population  estimates. 
Most  hunters  remained  unconvinced  that  there  was  any need 
to  reduce  hunting  pressure on the  stock.  The  meetings  neverthe- 
less  resulted  in  initiatives by the Pangnirtung  HTA  to  control 
and monitor the hunt, and in 1985 it banned all hunting in 
Clearwater  Fiord,  the  main  summer  concentration.  The  value 
of the  quota  system  was  often  questioned  during  these  meetings. 
Some  hunters  complained  that  the  existence  of  a  catch  limit 
promoted  a  sense  of  competition  among  hunters,  who  got as 
many belugas as possible  before  the  quota was reached.  Others 
thought  that it might  even  cause  the  quota  to  be  reached  when 
it otherwise might not have been under a no-limit system. 
Finally,  some  hunters  suggested  that  the  Cumberland  Sound 
belugas  were  also  hunted by Iqaluit  and  Lake  Harbour  hunters 
after  they  left  the  sound.  They  felt  that it was  unfair  that  Pang- 
nirtung  hunters  were  the  only  ones limited in their beluga  catch. 
For these  reasons, many hunters  advocated  a  no-limit  system, 
a  return  to  their  system  of  self-limitation. 
A  review  of  DFO  and  other  surveys  showed  the  variation 
in seasonal  range  of  belugas  in SE Baffin  waters  (Richard  and 
Orr, 1986). This review  gave  support  to  the  suggestion by some 
Pangnirtung  hunters  that  he  belugas  that  concentrate  in 
Cumberland  Sound  in  summer  were  probably  also  hunted by 
Iqaluit  and  Lake  Harbour  hunters at other  times of the year. 
This  led  the  DFO to create in  1986  the  Beluga  Management 
Committee  (BMC),  formed of representatives of the DFO  and 
of HTAs from those three communities. 
This first BMC was unsuccessful in achieving consensus 
between the Inuit hunters and DFO representatives. DFO 
biologists  and  managers  expressed  their  concern  over  the  appar- 
ently  small size of the  population  stock  and the relatively large 
catch  to  which  it  was  subjected.  They  urged  reductions  in  catches 
in  all three communities  because  of their perception  that  the 
stock would ultimately  decline to extinction  in  relatively little 
time (Richard, 1991a). Hunters from all three communities 
expressed their resentment  at  being  told by non-native  govern- 
ment  employees  what o do  with a resource they  had been using 
for centuries  and which in their opinion  showed no signs of 
a decline. 
Being purely  informal  and advisory, the BMC did  not  have 
a defined structure or any real authority to effect changes. 
Consequently, the community  representatives  did  not  feel they 
were  really part of the process, since they were  not  directly 
involved  in  the  research and, despite  the  consultation,  they  felt 
they were not part of the final decision making. They also 
perceived  that the DFO  representatives at the BMC were not 
the decision  makers. The BMC  was  nevertheless  instrumental 
in  implementing a sampling program, a program  well  supported 
by the communities because it involves hunters directly in 
data  acquisition by employing  them  to do the  beluga  measuring 
and sampling. 
. Other  developments  precipitated  this  problem to the level of 
a crisis. In 1988, the  department’s  Arctic Fisheries Scientific 
Advisory  Committee  (AFSAC)  recommended a total  cessation 
of the hunt  in Pangnirtung  and  Iqaluit  and a seasonal  closure 
in  Lake  Harbour  (Cosens et al., 1990). The stock  was  subse- 
quently designated “endangered” by the Committee on the 
Status of Endangered  Wildlife in Canada  (COSEWIC)  in  1989 
(Richard, 1991a).  The  DFO  presented  its  position on SE Baffin 
belugas to the NWMAB in  January  1990. The NWMAB heard 
opposing  arguments  from  DFO  representatives  and  from  hunter 
representatives  and  recommended a temporary  quota of five 
belugas for each of the three communities,  to be in  effect for 
two years. It further recommended  that the  DFO  conduct  another 
survey  in  1990 to update  the  stock’s  status. The Minister of 
Fisheries and  Oceans  accepted the recommendations,  and  the 
new quotas  were  added to the Beluga  Protection  Regulations 
in June 1990. 
There was a reaction of dismay  and  hostility  towards  these 
quotas in the  three SE Baffin  communities.  The  fact  that  the 
new quotas were recommended by the NWMAB, a joint 
management  body  with  equal  Inuit  representation, carried very 
little weight.  Few  hunters had ever heard of the NWMAB  and 
the new quotas  were  considered an assault on the  harvesting 
rights of Inuit at a time when the Nunawt Land Claim 
Agreement-in-Principle specifically recognized these rights 
(Anonymous,  1990).  The  new  quotas  were  widely  ignored  over 
the  summer  of  1990,  and the year ended  with a catch of about 
50 belugas  over quota. Following a seizure of  muktuk from a 
beluga  killed  after closure had  been  posted,  the  DFO  office  in 
Iqaluit was  occupied  by a group of hunters  demanding  restitu- 
tion of the muktuk.  Various  demonstrations  were  also  held  in 
Iqaluit  that  captured the attention of the  local  media. 
The  recommended  surveys  were carried  out  during  the  second 
week  of  August  1990  throughout SE Baffin  coastal  waters  with 
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an  emphasis  on  the  population’s  concentration area in upper 
Cumberland  Sound.  Inuit  from  the three communities  partici- 
pated  in  the  surveys  in  their area. During  the  same  period,  counts 
from cliffs overlooking  Clearwater  Fiord  and a boat  survey of 
western  Cumberland  Sound  were  conducted by Pangnirtung 
HTA members. The aerial surveys showed no statistically 
detectable difference from the  1986  count.  It is unknown if the 
population has remained  stable or has  continued  to  decline  since 
1986  because the low precision of the estimates  and  the  count- 
ing  biases  do  not  allow  sufficient  statistical  power  to  detect  even 
a large change in population size (Richard, unpubl. data; 
Gerrodette, 1987). It is clear, though, that the rapid decline 
predicted earlier (Richard  and Orr, 1986; Richard, 1991a)  has 
not  taken  place.  Hunters  interpreted  the  results  of no discernible 
decline  as  proof  that the DFO  was  wrong  in  predicting  any 
decline. They also felt that  their role in the  surveys had  been 
insufficient  and  the  survey results were  widely rejected. Local 
groups, frustrated with DFO staff, lobbied the Minister of 
Fisheries and  Oceans  directly to have the quotas  removed. 
In view  of the impasse, the Minister  accepted  an offer by the 
Iqaluit  member  of  the  Northwest  Territorial  Legislative  Assembly 
to create an ad hoc group led by the  Science Institute of the 
Northwest Territories. This group would look at ways of 
integrating scientific and local knowledge for the effective 
management  of the  stock.  The  committee was  composed  of  one 
representative from each of the three SE Baffin  communities, 
a DFO  resource  person  and  the director of the  Science Institute 
as facilitator. The report of this committee was submitted to 
the  Minister  in June 1991  (Ikkidluak et al., 1991). It states  that 
the Inuit  believe  that  belugas  harvested by the three communi- 
ties do not  belong to the  same  stock  and  that  the current harvest 
does  not  threaten  the  beluga  stock.  The  quota  of  five  per  commu- 
nity is described as a cruel act, causing a great deal of uncer- 
tainty akin to the  “grief  associated  with  the  loss f a loved one” 
(Ikkidluak et al., 199l:l). The Inuit express a sense of loss of 
purpose, loss of control over their lives, and a sense that 
“democracy  did  not  work for  them,” resulting  in “thoughts to 
disobey  the law” (Ikkidluak el al., 1991:2). They fear for the 
loss of culture that would ensue if belugas  cannot be harvested 
and’decry the lack of recognition of “traditional (Inuit) conser- 
vation  practices  which forbade mass slaughter of any wildlife” 
(Ikkidluak et al., 1991:2). 
In the interest of achieving “a positive  relationship  that  will 
lead to better  information  and to improved  long-term  beluga 
management’’ (Ikkidluak et al., 1991 :3), the report makes 
several  recommendations.  It  recommends  that  the  1991  quota for 
each  community be set at 35  and  that a formal  co-management 
structure  be  set up to “design, plan  and  conduct  beluga  manage- 
ment studies” with a long-term  focus on “integrating  traditional 
and scientific knowledge” to “establish and  review  sustainable 
harvest  quotas  with  confidence”  (Ikkidluak et al., 1991:15). 
The Minister accepted the recommendations, and additional 
discussions  between the DFO  and  committee  members  led to 
an agreement  that  Pangnirtung,  Iqaluit  and  Lake  Harbour  would 
have  interim  quotas  respectively of 35, 35 and 20 (note:  Lake 
Harbour’s  quota  of 20 applies  from spring to fall; hunting  in 
winter is unrestricted). In addition, DFO  and  community 
representatives would  work to establish a co-management 
structure and  the  department would  commit  substantial  funding 
to beluga  studies  in  1992  and  1993. The Planning  Committee 
for the Co-management of Beluga Whales in SE Baffin  was 
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created in November 1992 and charged with developing a 
co-management structure and  proposing a long-term  plan 
for research and management of the SE Baffin belugas by 
May 1993. 
DISCUSSION 
What  lessons  can  we  draw from the SE Baffin  experience? 
There are obvious  problems  with  language,  as well as cultural 
differences, compounded  by a changing  membership  in  the  HTA 
and  government  representation  at  meetings  dealing  with this 
issue.  But  there are more  important  problems  that  go  to  the  heart 
of the matter. First, it is clear in this case that incomplete 
co-management  did  not  work.  The  DFO  had  regulations i  place 
limiting  beluga  hunting  practices  before  hunters  were  involved 
in the research in a way that  could  have  made  them  feel part 
of the  process  leading  to a management  decision.  It  was  not 
sufficient  to  inform  HTAs  about  our  findings  and  our  conclu- 
sions  on  the  status  of a stock,  note  their  reactions  and  then  make 
a regulatory decision. Hunters want to be equal partners in 
decision  making  in a consensual  manner  more  consistent  with 
their culture. Participation in the first BMC was reluctant 
because they  had  no sense of  being equal partners in decisions, 
so their approach to the BMC process was largely adversarial. 
Consequently,  when  the  Minister  accepted  the  NWMAB  quota 
recommendations, SE Baffin hunters  felt  completely 
disenfranchised. 
In a similar  vein,  the  hunters’ initial interest in  the  surveys 
and other aspects of the research was minimal,  either  because 
they did not clearly  understand  the  methods  used, or perhaps 
doubted  the  effectiveness of these  methods, or were  confused 
about  the  purpose  of  our  work.  That  changed  when  they  realized 
the  full  implications of our results. Finally, a major  mistake 
on our part was to simplify our message to convince  them of 
our  point of view. By simplifying the information  we  brought 
to  them,  de-emphasizing  the  imprecision of our methods  and 
over-emphasizing the certainty of our conclusions, we did 
ourselves a disservice. Had  we  shown  the detail of the results 
and  acknowledged  the  imprecision  and uncertainty, we could 
have  explained  that  our  alarm at the status of the  stock is an 
educated guess based on various sources of data, not  on 
certainty, and  that  the  precision of the  methods  may  not  allow 
certainty until it is too late. This failure at openness about 
the detail of our  results  and  the  thought  process  behind our 
conclusions and dire  predictions had a very  negative 
consequence. When the 1990 survey results did not yield 
positive proof of a decline, the assessment methods and 
conclusions  were  dismissed entirely. 
The will to manage their hunt does exist among hunters. 
SE  Baffin  hunters  showed  their  willingness to make  changes 
to their hunting practices when they accepted quotas and 
protected  Clearwater  Fiord  from  hunting.  The  stalemate 
occurred when  the  people  directly  affected felt cut  off  from  the 
decision  process for reasons  that they  did  not  fully understand. 
To be effective, co-management structures need to achieve a 
greater degree of power  sharing  between  hunter  and  govern- 
ment representatives. But in addition, managers  must  maintain 
direct contact  with  each  community  and  involve  hunters  in  all 
aspects of the research. 
The  SE Baffin beluga case has  been  an  experience  of  relevance 
to future Eastern  Canadian  Arctic  small  whale  co-management. 
It provides a practical  example of what can go wrong  in  an 
incomplete  co-management  process  and  points  the  way  toward 
resolving such problems in the future. The future Nunavut 
Wildlife Management Board established under the Nunavut 
Land  Claim  and the Canada/Greenland  Joint  Commission for 
the  Conservation  and  Management of Narwhal  and  Beluga  will 
have to address  issues  related  to  the  other  Eastern  Canadian 
Arctic  small  whale  stocks.  What are their chances of success? 
Many  of  the conditions  favourable to co-management 
proposed  by  Pinkerton  (1989)  appear  to  exist  with  Eastern  Arctic 
beluga  and  narwhal  co-management. First, the future Nunavut 
Wildlife  Management  Board  and the extant  Canada/Greenland 
Joint  Commission are formal  co-management  agreements  and 
the former is legal  and  long  term  and  will be supported  finan- 
cially  under the terms of the land  claim  agreement. It is hoped 
that  they  will  profit  from  the  lessons  of  the SE Baffin  experience. 
Second, those who stand to benefit from the success of the 
co-management process, the hunters, have a cohesive social 
system  and  that  success  can  contribute to conserve  and  enhance 
their cultural system by maintaining a resource on which it 
depends. 
On the other  hand,  while  each  hunting  community  can  effec- 
tively  define  its  boundaries,  belugas  and  narwhals  have  extensive 
ranges  and are migratory. Consequently, a single  population 
can  be  hunted  by  several  hunting  communities.  In  the  case of 
Baffin Bay narwhals  and  belugas, these populations may be 
hunted by ten communities or more in Canada and West 
Greenland.  Getting  consensus  among so many different  groups 
may prove to be difficult. 
Co-management of belugas and narwhals would probably 
operate better if it  were  possible to determine  precisely  trends 
in  population  size  and  the  factors  affecting  these trends. Unfor- 
tunately,  whale  populations are difficult  to  assess  even  with  the 
use of modem techniques of survey and sampling designs. 
Trends may  not  be detected  until large changes in population 
size  have occurred, and  this is exacerbated by the  SE  Baffln 
beluga  stock’s  small size. Locally  concentrated  whale  popula- 
tions  such  as  the  SE  Baffin  population may appear  abundant 
to local  observers  until they  suddenly  decline to a point  at  which 
it is often  too late to conserve  the  population. A good  example 
of this problem is the  recent  near  extirpation of the Ungava  Bay 
beluga population (Finley et al., 1982; Smith and Hammill, 
1986;  Reeves  and  Mitchell,  1989).  Management  biologists will 
often prefer to estimate  the size of populations  conservatively 
and  reduce  the risk of depletion, as was the case for the  SE 
Baffin  beluga.  In contrast, hunters may prefer the  high  side of 
estimates  because restrictions mean  less  opportunity to 
experience an important cultural activity  and a highly  valued 
food.  Consequently,  agreement  on  stock  status is not  an  easy 
goal to achieve. 
Finally, co-management  probably  operates  best  if  all parties 
can agree on  common objectives for management  and  on  the 
effective  means  to  achieve  these goals. As  we have  seen  in  the 
SE  Baffin  beluga  example, a common  problem  in  discussions 
between  resource  users and  managers is that  they  avoid  dealing 
with  implicit  objectives of  both  sides,  yet  these  unspoken  objec- 
tives are often central to the understanding of the problem 
(Walters,  1986). To enhance  its  effectiveness, a co-management 
body  would  be  well  advised  to  establish  simple  rules  of  decision 
making  on  the  status  of  the  stock  relative  to its objectives  and 
appropriate management responses. These rules should be 
widely  accepted by users if  they are to allow  timely  changes 
in  management regime, 
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In conclusion,  the  challenges for co-management of Eastern 
Canadian  Arctic  beluga  and  narwhal are: 
a)  to ensure effective  communication of information  among 
hunters  and  government  biologists  and  managers,  despite  the 
vast geographic setting and large and dispersed number of 
groups  involved. This cannot be achieved  without a streamlined 
co-management  organization  at  he  regional,  national  and 
international levels, or without  substantial  long-term  funding. 
b)  to jointly develop  and  extend a common  knowledge  base 
on  beluga  and  narwhal  incorporating  traditional  and  scientific 
knowledge, despite cultural differences and recognizing the 
difficulties of directly  assessing  stock  status.  Again, th is  cannot 
be accomplished  without  effective  communication  among  the 
parties  involved  in  data  gathering  and  long-term  funding. 
c) to develop common objectives for co-management and 
identify means of achieving them, including simple rules of 
decision  making  that  would  allow  timely  response  to  stock status 
information,  particularly  that which suggests a declining  trend. 
Co-management of small  whales  has a long way  to  go before 
it  becomes  effective  and before new relationships  fundamental 
to  its  success  develop  between  governments  and users. Given 
that  the alternative to co-management - namely,  enforcement 
without the  support of a majority of resource  users - is unlikely 
to be effective  and  could result in  situations  detrimental to all 
Eastern  Arctic  beluga  and  narwhal  stocks,  we  have no alterna- 
tive  but  to  take  up  the  co-management  challenge  if  we  want to 
conserve  these  populations for future generations. 
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